gives a human life meaning, coherence, and closure (Arendt 1995) . There is enclosure in the sense of physical objectivity: being continuously present to the senses, surrounded by a medium, detachable from context, and portable across contexts (Gibson 1986 ). There is enclosure as the extension of a network: creating the conditions for scientific objects to reproduce their effects outside the laboratory (Latour 1988) . There is enclosure in the sense of scientific objectivity: a form of knowledge that is spatially and temporally portable, so far as it holds good independently of the process of its production (Porter 1995) . There is enclosure as articulation: conferring propositional content on an experience, and hence the possibility of truth-value, by means of making an assertion. There is enclosure as entextualization (Bauman and Briggs 1990) : the process of making signs seem amenable to cross-contextual interpretation. There is enclosure as commoditization: on the one hand, the process in which something is alienated, unitized, quantified, standardized, and priced, and on the other hand, the process through which something is produced, circulated, and consumed. Following Whorf (1956) , there is the enclosure of formless substances with substanceless forms, as evinced in any set of measures: pats of butter, bolts of cloth, square meters of space, hours of time, and bricks of gold. There is enclosure as material labor: making products that last beyond the production process itself, such that they may be more widely circulated, and ultimately more highly valued, before being consumed (Smith 1976 (Smith [1776 ). And finally, following Marx and Foucault, there is the historical phenomenon of enclosure: on the one hand, that process whereby common lands were turned into private property, and peasants became proletariat, and on the other hand, that process whereby such doubly freed persons -from both masters and means of production -were brought into disciplinary institutions, from the workhouse to the asylum.
Various modes of enclosure may therefore be seen as both the condition and consequence of disclosure. That is, knowledge of and power over any given domain is both facilitated by and productive of various forms of enclosure. And, in this vein, ethnography has a relatively precarious position: on the one hand, it seeks to interpret local modes of enclosure and disclosure, and on the other hand, its interpretations at once enclose and disclose.
